Judge Rules Dan Schneider Libel Suit Against 'Quiet On Set' Producers Can Continue

If you want to see what a lot of money and some high-end lawyers can get you in court, look no further than the ongoing battle between former Nickelodeon producer Dan Schneider and the producers of Quiet On Set: The Dark Side Of Kids TV.

Following the release of the documentary earlier this year, Schneider filed a defamation lawsuit against Warner Bros. Discovery (which owns Investigation Discovery), Maxine Productions (which produced the docuseries), Sony Pictures Television (which owns Maxine Productions), docuseries producers Emma Schwartz and Mary Robertson, along with 50 unnamed Does.

In the complaint, Schneider argued the documentary implied that he was knowledge and/complicit in the allegations of sexual abuse included in the series.

The case has been winding its way through the courts ahead of a trial and the focus of the battle has been an effort by the defendants to have the case dismissed under California's anti-SLAPP statute. 

SLAPP stands for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation and refers to lawsuits brought by individuals and entities to dissuade their critics from continuing to produce negative publicity. The defendants in this case have argued Schneider's lawsuit fits this description and should be dismissed with prejudice (which means it can't be filed again).

In a hearing in October, the complaint was tentatively stricken by Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge Ashfaq G. Chowdhury, who wrote that the ultimate reason for dismissal centered around the case law for California Civil Code 44, which requires the plaintiff to not only prove libel, but also provide proof that the facts at dispute are not true. And according to the judge, Schneider failed to do the latter.

The judge also expressed concern that most of the proof the average viewer who watched Quiet On Set would think Schneider was guilty of sexually abusing children submitted by Schneider attorney Gerry Silver, a partner at Sullivan and Worcester, cited various social media comments from YouTube videos and tweets on X as indications that confusion by the viewers was likely. Defense counsel Grygiel argued that the comments were indicative of nothing, since it was impossible to know whether the people making the comments were real or truly believed what they had written.

Judge Ashfaq G. Chowdhury seemed increasingly unsure of the answer to this problem, finally saying "Social media, I think we can all agree, is not a wellspring of truth and reasonableness." He also noted that trying to determine social media inferences and implications is a "slippery slope."

In the end, Judge Chowdhury tentatively dismissed the charges pending a further hearing. According to California case law, a tentative ruling is the proposed ruling of the court. Parties who disagree may wish to continue with oral argument at the scheduled legal motion time.

A follow-up hearing was held on Friday, November 22nd and centered around a couple of issues. One of which was that while Schneider had filed a declaration with the court that he had "never sexually assaulted or sexually abused a child," the declaration was not signed under penalty of perjury, as is required under the law.

The second issue revolved around whether Schneider had proven the case was baseless or not. In other words, did the producer file the suit in order restrict the free speech of the defendants, or was there reason to believe the plaintiff might be able to prove his allegations in a trial? In this situation, the judge isn't considering the arguments of the defendants. It comes down to whether or not the plaintiff has a reasonable reason to file the lawsuit and is there a reason to believe he might be able to prove those allegations in court?

After some discussion, Judge Ashfaq G. Chowdhury issued this ruling on the case:

Despite the issues with the declaration, the Court finds that, contingent on the submission of an amended, proper declaration, plaintiff will have met the prima facie showing for a cause of action for defamation. This Court is generally of the view that substance should generally prevail over form. (See Troyk v. Farmers Grp., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1332-33.) Yes, the Schneider declaration did not say “under penalty of perjury.” But it was submitted in court, titled a “Declaration of Dan Schneider,” and both Schneider in his declaration and his attorney in Court affirmed that he would so testify under oath.

This, in combination with the evidence pointed to in Opposition, including the additional declarations, persuades the Court that Plaintiff has met his burden (assuming he submits a proper declaration).

The Court could grant this motion and dismiss this entire defamation action based on the failure to insert one line in a declaration that was hurriedly submitted at the hearing. The Court could point out that counsel for plaintiff should have submitted the declaration with the opposition, and should have made sure that the declaration was in the proper form when submitting it at the hearing.

But, again, to do so, in this Court’s view, would be to elevate form over substance. Any reasonable person reviewing the materials before the Court would see that there are significant legal issues presented, and that Plaintiff’s case has at least minimal merit.

The anti-SLAPP statute was passed to protects parties engaged in political or other expression from being stifled by bad-faith tort actions—often for political reasons. (Ryan Stahl, California’s Anti-SLAPP Statute , The Bar Association of San Francisco Summer 2016, available at <<
https://www.sfbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/anti-slapp.pdf >>.) Initially, the purpose of the statute was to protect speakers from potentially frivolous, bad-faith lawsuits meant to intimidate speakers and chill their speech. (Id.) 

To be sure, the application of the anti-SLAPP statute has evolved since its enactment, in ways that its drafters perhaps may not have anticipated. But in construing the statute here, the Court does believe it should keep in mind the purpose of the statute. The statute provides a mechanism to essentially short-circuit a case, and conduct a type of early summary-judgment process, if the claims implicate “free speech”—a term for which that the anti-SLAPP statute has produced broad interpretations. There’s no question in this case that Plaintiff’s claims involve free speech.

The parties agree on that.

However, this is manifestly not a case brought by Schneider on frivolous grounds, simply to harass defendants. He’s suing Defendants about a documentary they made about him, that focuses on his activities, and, which a reasonable viewer might conclude makes damning
implications about his conduct. This is all to say that this is not the type of baseless lawsuit—one without “minimal merit” that the anti-SLAPP statute was designed to weed out.

To dismiss at this juncture based on the improper form of the declaration would throw out this suit for, in the Court’s view, hyper-technical reasons that also would not make much sense. Would the Defendants be contending that Schneider is conceding that he engaged in sexual
misconduct with children? This entire lawsuit’s premise is that he was falsely portrayed in a light that implied he engaged in that type of activity. Schneider says he did not engage in such activity, his entire legal position is that the implications are false.

Plaintiff’s Opposition argues persuasively that defamation can be implied, that the trailer and documentary state or imply Schneider sexually abused children who worked on his show and that Schneider was a child sexual abuser, and how the ordinary viewer understands the trailer and documentary to be defamatory.

The Court agrees that Plaintiff has carried his burden on the second step. Plaintiff has shown that his claim has at least “minimal merit,” for the purposes of this stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis. (Baral, supra, 384-385.) Plaintiff has pointed to a substantial amounts of evidence that could support his theory of implied defamation.

Thus, Plaintiff has satisfied the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis (subject to submitting a proper declaration).

RULING
Defendants’ motion to strike the Complaint pursuant to CCP § 425.16 is DENIED, contingent on Plaintiff submitting Declaration under penalty of perjury from Plaintiff. Plaintiff is ordered to submit this declaration within 5 business days of this order. This order will be finalized once an appropriate declaration is submitted. 

In simple terms, the ruling denied the defendant's motion to strike the Complaint pursuant to CCP § 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute), contingent on the Plaintiff (Schneider) submitting a declaration under penalty of perjury to the court with 5 business days of the order. So the case will continue.

The next step will be a status conference, to be held on December 11th, 2024.